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OUR IMPERIAL FIRST AMENDMENT
Paul D. Carrington*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PREMISES OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
I come to the First Amendment not as a member of the cogno-
scenti, but as an observer of the secondary effects on judicial in-
stitutions of some interpretations of the Amendment made over
the last thirty-five years or so. I deplore those specific effects and
I will be direct in saying so. But in considering them, I have been
struck by the extent of the federal courts' progress in subordi-
nating to their own governance a wide range of other issues of
great concern to citizens, all in the name of the First Amendment,
a text intended to foster democratic institutions.
This usurpation has been achieved by extravagant interpreta-
tion of the Amendment to fashion a new and elastic principle of
natural law. That principle has been stretched to fit a wide array
of matters very distant from the aims of the First Amendment or
of the Fourteenth (through which the First Amendment has been
made applicable to state and local governments) as those aims
have been generally understood by the citizens disfranchised by
this overreaching by the federal judiciary.
The premises from which my sweeping criticism of current
First Amendment law proceeds will be viewed by some readers as
idiosyncratic. That would not have been so in former times for my
premises were shared by persons dominating American politics
* Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University. This article is presented as part of the
Allen Chair Symposium for 2000 at the University of Richmond School of Law. It is an ex-
pansion of a chapter of my book STEwARDS OF DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC PROFESSION
(1999) and reflects the theme of that work. Numerous persons were exposed to earlier
drafts; those who tried to save me from error by their helpful comments were Walter Del-
linger, Dan Farber, Martin Golding, Leno Graglia, Anthony Lewis, Robert Nagel, Tom
Phillips, and William Van Alstyne. Diane Descoteaux and Amy Van Middlesworth helped
with the references.
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for a century and a half. My premises were expressed in the sec-
ond and third sentences of the Declaration of Independence.1
They animated the eighteenth century anti-federalists who re-
garded the Constitution of the United States as originally drafted
by Madison and others as a grave threat to their democratic aspi-
rations, and who demanded not only the First Amendment as a
restraint on Congress but also, and even more urgently, the right
to jury trial in civil cases as a means of limiting the role and
power of judges with life tenure.2 My premises were shared as
well by those Jeffersonians who cheered the French Revolution in
its early years before the advent of the Jacobins and the erection
of the guillotine,3 and by Jacksonians who mistrusted the pluto-
cratic aims of the Bank of the United States and who insisted on
the right to hold judges exercising broad political powers ac-
countable to the people at the ballot box.4 The same premises un-
derlie the most memorable rhetoric of Abraham Lincoln 5 and his
counterpart in constitutional scholarship, Thomas Cooley.6 Those
premises were shared as well by many Progressives, most em-
phatically by my heroes, Louis Brandeis and his counterpart in
constitutional scholarship, Ernst Freund.7
The first of those premises is that the communitarian right of
citizens to self-government is the primary value that ought to
dominate our politics and our law. The second, which follows from
the first, is that the law belongs to Everyman, not to a special
class of aristocrats and intellectuals professing a morality they
deem superior to that of the citizens whom they presume to gov-
1. CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL IDEAS 197-200 (1922); MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 73-76 (1978); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 234, 270 (1991).
2. See THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 45, 49-52 (Cecilia M. Kenyon ed., 1966); Edith Guild
Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 289-90
(1966); Charles Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN.
L. REV. 639, 644 (1973).
3. See PATRICE HIGONNET, SISTER REPUBLICS: THE ORIGINS OF FRENCH AND
AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM 1-11 (1988).
4. See MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF 6-9
(1957); HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA
139 (1990).
5. See GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA
90-120 (1992).
6. PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC PROFESSION
55-81 (1999).
7. For brief accounts of their careers and thought, see id. at 121-36.
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ern. The third, which also follows from the first, is that the Con-
stitution of the United States guarantees a republican, not an oli-
garchic, and certainly not a plutocratic, form of government. The
Constitution was intended and ought to be read to authorize the
Court to brake majoritarian impulses when there is a basis for
doing so in a legal text as understood by the citizens who are
subject to it, but not as a commission to the federal judiciary to
displace broadly the moral and political judgments of democratic
electorates with its own preferences.
While my acceptance of the need for a democratic political pro-
cess is not now widely shared among the elite of the United
States, I am not alone in observing that, beginning with the suc-
cessful outcome of World War II, America has substantially for-
saken moral-political-legal premises that had dominated its poli-
tics for about a hundred and fifty years. Among others noticing
this event are Michael Sandel,' Robert Wiebe,9 Benjamin Bar-
ber,'0 and the late Christopher Lasch," all of them eminent social
scientists and wise observers. Seemingly invisible to our courts is
the difference between doing good and requiring others to do it.
There were always, it ought be acknowledged, Americans who
rejected the Declaration of Independence as political humbug use-
fil only as an "opiate of the people." Alexander Hamilton was
eminent among those revolutionaries who were feudal lords at
heart. 2 The slave-owning class always dissented from the Decla-
ration, as did the barons of industry and the social Darwinists of
the late nineteenth century. The banners borne by such Ameri-
cans are now borne by many of our contemporaries including nu-
merous intellectual movements spanning the political spectrum.
What caused the demise of democratic values that Sandel,
Wiebe, Barber, Lasch, and I observe? Surely the causes are
8. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996).
9. See generally ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1995).
10. See generally BENJAMIN BARBER, THE CONQUEST OF POLITICS: LIBERAL PHILOSO-
PRY IN DEMOCRATIC TIMEs (1988).
11. See generally CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE
BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY (1995).
12. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERICK McKITIrIC, THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC
103-04 (1993) (analyzing Alexander Hamilton's speech at the Philadelphia Convention on
June 18, 1778); see also CLINTON ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE
CONSTITUTION 14 (1964) (describing generally Alexander Hamilton's character).
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largely external and not the result of rational planning or
scheming. 3 So perhaps the change was inevitable. In the twenti-
eth century, the chances of life and of geography called America
to the role of empire. We are as a consequence, I fear, tracking
the path marked by earlier republics such as Athens, Rome, and
Venice and so elegantly depicted by Gibbon.'4
We are told that the first step on those republics' path to de-
cline and fall was military success bringing a false sense of invul-
nerability. The second was economic success bringing a deepening
of class lines dividing those who prospered most from the impe-
rial engagement from those who prospered least. The third was
the attainment of moral arrogance among the former, centered in
a community of leaders who assured one another that their collec-
tive wisdom and virtue was so vastly superior to that of the un-
washed that imperial rule is justified.
When one looks for evidence of moral arrogance in a ruling
class in America, the jurisprudence of the First Amendment pres-
ents itself as one striking exhibit. 5 The text of the Amendment,
intended to express a right central to democratic self-government,
has been transmogrified into the means by which life-tenured
judges supported by an intellectual elite and the barons of the
media suppress self-government and force on fellow citizens the
moral and political precepts of a ruling class. These precepts
strongly favor powerful individuals (such as those who profit from
the "infotainment" industry) and their profit-seeking corporations
over citizens' rights to make collective decisions about the com-
munities in which they live and work. Those looking for a cause
to enlist under a banner bearing the revered motto "Don't Tread
on Me"'6 can find it in today's First Amendment.
13. Another contributing cause may have been the movement of the Supreme Court
into its highly pretentious quarters. Louis Brandeis refused to occupy chambers in that
building and foretold that it would foster an atmosphere conducive to judicial arrogance.
ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 628-29 (1946). A possible response to
the problem depicted here would be to return the Court to the facilities in the basement of
the Capitol that it occupied until 1929.
14. See generally EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
RoMAN EMPIRE (J.B. Bury ed., The Heritage Press 1946) (1776).
15. For a comprehensive presentation of the case law, see generally WILLIAM W. VAN
ALSTYNE, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (1995). The institutional arro-
gance of the Court is not limited to this subject. For another, see Paul D. Carrington &
Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331 (1997).
16. This was the motto on the flag of the first American naval vessels to engage in the
Revolutionary War. I am told that it is reappearing on banners of "militia" units in some
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II. THE REPUBLICAN IDEA OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In 1925, Louis Brandeis joined in extending First Amendment
restraints to state and local government by incorporating that
provision into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 7 despite the fact that the textual and historical basis for
that extension was, at best, inconclusive. 8 This was a rare depar-
ture for him from a stern self-discipline by which he aimed to
keep the Supreme Court of the United States on the straight and
narrow trail of deference to the role of those government officers
who represent the people and who are accountable to them. That
deference (like the deference expressed in this article) was not
rooted in a romanticized vision of the wisdom of the people, but in
the belief that social peace and stability are best assured by the
opportunity of citizens to participate in their own governance and
by a disbelief in the superior wisdom (especially with respect to
moral issues) of those who put themselves forward as a ruling
class.
The compass of the First Amendment that Brandeis voted to
extend into the Fourteenth was narrow. 9 The idea was largely
confined to a thought that John Milton expressed in 1644:
Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according
to conscience above all liberties....
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the
earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and
prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and falsehood grapple;
who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?
Her confuting is the best and surest suppressing.20
The Amendment's protection thus articulated extended to
parts of the United States. I have seen one such flag in Kansas.
17. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925); see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 366-67 (1990) (stating that the Bill
of Rights only applies to the states to the extent that it is incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment).
18. See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5, 138 (1949).
19. David M. Rabban, Can Academic Freedom Survive Postmodernism?, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 1377, 1378 (1998) (reviewing THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM (Louis Menand ed.
1996)) (discussing the history of constraints on academic freedom).
20. JOHN MILTON, AEROPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING
(1644), reprinted in 32 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 381, 408-09 (1952).
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speech related to religious observance and political expression
motivated by conscience and a regard for truth, and even that
protection was not expressed in absolute terms. It assumed that
the marketplace of ideas would be a level space on which truth
might grapple with falsehood in "a free and open encounter."
21
Even Jefferson, while opposing "every form of tyranny over the
mind of man"22 (as the entablature on his monument records) was
willing to allow the citizens of a republic some room to distinguish
for themselves what is tyranny over the mind of man from what
is sound public policy.
No one in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,
or in 1925, when it was deployed to make the First Amendment
applicable to state and local governments, reckoned that the Con-
stitution of the United States had anything to say about laws for-
bidding deeds said by the actors to have symbolic meaning, por-
nography, obscenity, commercial speech, campaign finance, or
defamation. 23 In recent decades, the Supreme Court has constitu-
tionalized all of those subjects and thereby imposed its moral
judgments and that of lower federal courts not only on the federal
government, but also on state and local governments, effectively
foreclosing further political debate on the wisdom of the princi-
ples it applied. A secondary effect of that unauthorized seizure of
power is that our freedom of expression no longer is derived from
the tolerance and civility of the communities in which we express
ourselves and for which we share responsibility, but from what
Brandeis would have denoted as "foreign aid"24 imposed by a dis-
tant and imperial oligarchy sitting on the Supreme Court.
To some extent, the enlargement of First Amendment protec-
tion was prompted by the narrowest and most legitimate of Four-
teenth Amendment concerns for the right of African-American
citizens to express their indignation at racial segregation.2 ' But
21. Id. at 409.
22. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Rush (Sept. 23, 1800), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 173, 175 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh,
eds., 1905).
23. A contemporaneous account of the modest aims of the Fourteenth Amendment is
set forth in 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 648-77 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873). For a revisionist view, see generally
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
24. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES 259 (1982).
25. Cf. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (examining the protections
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments provided to a newspaper advertisement con-
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the Court has gone far beyond considerations of a vibrant political
process that was not long ago cited as the sovereign legitimization
of the unwritten Constitution crafted by the Court in the two dec-
ades after Brown v. Board of Education" was decided" and has
seldom attempted to reconcile its reasons for doing so with the
contrary politics expressed by the vote of the people." What we
have witnessed is a bloodless victory for the individual rights
celebrated by John Locke29 and chiefly enjoyed and exercised by
members of a ruling class over the rights of community celebrated
by Edmund Burke ° and shared by all. This has also been a stun-
ning triumph for the journalism profession and the entertain-
ment industry and a bitter defeat for moralists, the clergy, and
those who believe, as I do, in representative government.3"
III. PORNOGRAPHY, OBSCENITY AND GRAPHIC VIOLENCE
The Court's first major anti-democratic excursion to proceed
under the banner of both the First and Fourteenth Amendments
was the invalidation of local pornography laws. In 1957, the
Court affirmed a conviction under a federal statute forbidding the
use of the mails to convey obscene material.3 2 Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court, upheld the statute by interpreting it to be
applicable only to matter altogether lacking redemptive social
cerning the civil rights movement); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (hold-
ing that the NAACP's activities are modes of expression and association that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments protect). See generally HARRY KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1965) (detailing the general impact of the civil rights movement on
First Amendment law).
26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
28. Lee C. Bollinger, Elitism, the Masses and the Idea of Self-Government: Ambiva-
lence about the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, in CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN AimRICA 99 (Ronald I-L. Collins ed., 1980) (describing the Supreme
Courts decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as a major step in
defining the freedom of the press).
29. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 168-69 (Classics of Liberty Li-
brary 1992) (1690) (discussing the inherent liberties of man bestowed on him by nature).
30. See EDMUND BURKE, EDMUND BURKE ON GOVERNMENT, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 50-
51 (B.W. Hill ed., 1976).
31 There is deep irony in the Court's recent willingness, indeed seeming eagerness, to
invalidate acts of Congress that trench on the sovereignty of state government while the
Court has imposed no analogous restraint on itself. For a brief account of the Court's
newly revived federalism, and its irony, see Earl M. Malta, Justice Kennedy's Vision of
Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 761 (2000).
32. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957).
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importance.33 In 1973, the Court modified the standard to apply
to "works taken as a whole."
34
Insofar as those decisions affect only the federal government, I
take no strong exception to them. The issue appears in a different
light, however, when the standard is applied to prevent enforce-
ment of laws enacted by representative state or local government.
No doubt the application of a local standard by a jury or local cen-
sor evaluating artistic "works taken as a whole" can threaten the
values articulated by Milton and embodied in the First Amend-
ment. The arts, prized as instruments of social change, not infre-
quently offend and ought not be suppressed in a free society.
There is also, however, a wide range of material offensive to the
moralities prevailing in many communities for which the claim
can be only colorably made that a work as a whole has some
nominal intellectual content or literary value, but which falls far
short of making a contribution to the enduring struggle between
truth and falsehood. Moreover, the opportunities for enrichment
from the making of "art" that most citizens regard as dangerous
and malicious depravity have been greatly multiplied by the
technological advances of recent years, a matter of apparent indif-
ference to the Court.
Finding the distinction between art and smut elusive, the sec-
ond Justice Harlan repeatedly advocated, 36 with scant success,
37
that some accommodation ought to be made to allow for the dis-
cretion of state and local officials in drawing that line. As a con-
sequence of the Court's failure to observe his caution, the power
of the state or local government to restrain the circulation of
"adult" materials was closely confined. States and communities
were substantially disempowered to regulate a wide range of
commercially motivated activity exploiting diverse sexual or vio-
lent urges that do not comport with the hopes of many communi-
ties to channel sexuality into a framework of conventional family
life or some postmodern alternative social structure, or of civil
and humane relations with fellow citizens.
33. Id. at 485.
34. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 39 (1973).
35. Cf. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (involving a federal law seeking to regulate
electronic transmissions).
36. See A Book Named John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney
General, 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 169 (1959) (Harlan,
J., concurring); Roth, 354 U.S. at 503.
37. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 33.
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For example, a current, questionable application of the First
Amendment is its use to bar site-blocking software deployed by
local public libraries to prevent Internet access to pornography or
excessively graphic violence on their public access computers. 38 If,
as seems not unlikely, that decision is upheld on the ground that
the software might block access to protected speech, one result
will be that fewer children will be seen in public libraries as par-
ents strive to shield their children from exposure to such mate-
rial. Even the most explicit child pornography or most brutal
violence can be incorporated within some kind of drama that
might be said to have a point, and thus, taken as a whole, not
pornographic or obscene in the eyes of a federal judge and hence
accessible in public libraries.
It must be granted that a library making the wrong choice in
using its site-blocking software might prevent adults from having
free access to lurid but inspiring art. Yet, given the consequences,
a reasonable local library might make the decision to resolve
doubts by blocking material sufficiently lurid that reasonable
parents might prefer to keep their children out of the library
rather than provide them with access to the lurid material. That
would leave those desiring access to lurid material to find it with-
out the aid of the public library, a wound to individual freedom
that communities might reasonably choose to impose as the lesser
evil in the belief that there will be a net gain in community access
to information if the "adult" material is excluded and children
thus encouraged to use the library.
It seems to be widely accepted that no community library board
(or any other government entity)39 can or should consider whether
it ought refrain from supplying adults with material having re-
demptive artistic worth merely because its officers expect the
"art" to increase the frequency with which adult library patrons
express their sexual impulses in relationships with children or
commit acts of violence on fellow citizens. In this respect, it ap-
pears to matter not at all that the governing board of a public li-
brary is accountable at least indirectly to the people it serves, for
their views on such matters count for nothing. Nor does it matter
whether a reasonable observer could perceive that the "art" could
38. E.g., Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp.
2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
39. Cf. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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stand as well without as with the objectionable material. Nor
does it appear to matter that the presentation of material in a
public library is inescapably a suggestion by the institution (and
thus the public) that the material has some possible merit mak-
ing it worthy of the attention of library patrons.
Of course, wise citizens might share the view of many profes-
sional librarians that such moral judgments are not only beyond
their competence, but unsuited as well to the judgment of a com-
munity, and therefore best left entirely to individual library pa-
trons. Many public libraries would elect to provide their users
with material that is sexually explicit, exploits children, or pres-
ents extreme graphic violence. The point I wish to make is not
that adults should (or could) be barred from access to pornogra-
phy or extreme graphic violence, but that the decision to provide
access in a public library is not rightly seen as one of constitu-
tional stature to be made by life-tenured judges.
Also worth noting in this context are the remarkable claims to
First Amendment protection made by some members of the enter-
tainment industry. What is to be said of the constitutional right
to broadcast such events as a wrestling match in which the win-
ner is entitled to have sexual intercourse with the loser's wife, or
perhaps the loser's child, or one in which the loser is required to
kill and eat his own dog?4" Why stop with marrying a million-
aire-would it not attract a bigger audience if the candidates per-
formed sexual favors for the millionaire on camera, including
perhaps a little sexual violence? One cannot be surprised that
there is an audience for such events; we all are voyeurs. Indeed, if
there were cameras in the death chamber, we can be sure that a
sizeable audience would be attracted, just as Parisians would
gather around the guillotine. Indeed, why do networks not have
the right to broadcast such art and such newsworthy events?
They would turn a nice profit. It may be that communities are
even as a practical matter powerless to prevent such exploitative
"art" and reportage, but it is galling to many to hear that those
who broadcast such material are exercising a sacred right estab-
lished in our revered Constitution.
The response of the industry to expressed concerns about the
40. Such events are said to have been featured on WWF's Smackdown, a program ap-
pearing on UPN, a cable network. I have not witnessed them. If they have not yet occurred
on network television, just wait.
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graphic portrayal of violence is reluctantly to suggest techniques
for shielding children from their most brutalizing presentations,
as by such futile means as rating films. Members of the industry
assume an absolute constitutional right to broadcast or exhibit
anything that adults might pay to see. But even if such tech-
niques for excluding young viewers were effective (and one must
doubt that they could be), more is at stake than the protection of
children from moral influences of which their parents do not ap-
prove. A stable democratic society depends on a level of civility
derived from a shared respect for the human condition and for the
moral sensibilities of other citizens. Perhaps in some sense the
wrestling show described above is art, but it is also an invitation
to indulge brutal sentiments that a democracy might wisely sup-
press, in adults as well as in children, to the extent possible.
Consider also the industry that manufactures computer games.
There are now in all of our communities numerous persons of di-
verse ages who spend many hours a day engaging in spectacu-
larly brutal violence against other humans as portrayed in highly
realistic electronic graphics. Perhaps those among us who are
prone to rape, mayhem, torture, and murder can, in this way,
gratify and expend their urges on a computer screen, but a com-
munity might not unreasonably reckon that such recreations will
have the opposite effect. It is contended by the industry that even
they are constitutionally protected.4'
Violent language is another offense that communities are dis-
empowered to constrain. The Court has explained that the viewer
of the words "Fuck the Draft" can simply avert his eyes and thus
avoid any injury, and so his interest is trumped by the sacred
right to use four-letter words. 2
Very little is really known about the social consequences of
pornography, obscenity, or graphic violence. The abundant em-
pirical data is gathered in circumstances so rife with causes and
effects that conclusions must be tentative. Nevertheless, the data
tend to confirm the widely shared intuition that extreme graphic
violence is a contributing cause of real violence.' Sexually ex-
41. E.g., Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Cottey, No. IP 00-1321-C H/G, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15076 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2000). The association did not obtain the prelimi-
nary injunction it sought against an ordinance. Id. at *4.
42. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
43. A very brief review is available at Kerby Anderson, Television Violence, Kerby An-
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plicit "art" may be, as many in the entertainment industry pro-
fess to believe, harmless or even benign, but the contrary position
cannot be disproved. It is at least possible that much sexual ma-
terial is, as some contend, degrading to the status of women 44 as
well as hostile to widely favored norms of sexual conduct or a
provocation to violence and, therefore, a provocation to antisocial
conduct.
As Justice Harlan observed, the federal interest in constraining
state and local officials and courts with respect to the manage-
ment of public libraries or other forms of distribution of material
containing child pornography or extreme graphic violence is at
best attenuated.45 Those who vote for state and local officials are
not demonstrably wrong to believe that artistic freedom ought to
be compromised to protect "family values" and encourage civil de-
portment. That sort of compromise is what state and local politi-
cal institutions were designed to achieve.46 Perhaps that means
that there will be marginally less artistic freedom available to
citizens of a democracy than is available to artists who have the
patronage of an absolute monarch. If a particular work of art is
censored in a community, the primary forum in which to grieve
should be a legislature, a city council, or a jury. The secondary fo-
rum should be a state supreme court enforcing the freedom of ex-
pression provisions of state constitutions; most such courts are in
some way accountable to the people they represent. A judge
holding tenure for life and invoking an unwritten and almost
unamendable text ought to become involved only in matters of
grave abuse of power by state government such as the systematic
suppression of a specific idea or sentiment. Thus, if the city fa-
thers of Atlanta are so unwise as to prevent the exhibition of so
excellent a film as Carnal Knowledge,47 the most appropriate re-
sponse is for the voters to "throw the rascals out," or perhaps sue
them in state court. That was the law until recent times.
derson's Commentaries, at http'//www.probe.org/docs/c-tvviol.html (Apr. 14, 2000). A full
review is in WENDY L. JOSEPHSON, TELEVISION VIOLENCE: A REVIEW OF THE EFFECTS ON
CHILDREN OF DIFFERENT AGES (1995).
44. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSE ON LIFE AND
LAW 163 (1987).
45. See A Book Named John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney
General, 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 169 (1959); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503 (1957).
46. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opin-
ion, Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REV. 603
(1990) (analyzing the theory behind the line of Supreme Court decisions in which First
Amendment protections have been extended to outrageous or offensive speech).
47. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
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IV. CHURCH AND STATE
The Court has virtually forbidden state or local government to
encourage religious faith. Religious freedom has at times been
displaced by freedom from religion.
Many of the Founders, Washington and Jefferson not least
among them, shared a loose deism bordering on unbelief, but they
perceived religion to be a necessary element in democratic life."
In its decisions, the Court has gone far beyond the requirements
of Jefferson's great testament to religious freedom emblazoned on
the wall in Old Richmond. 9 Cooley and Brandeis, although not
themselves committed to any religious faith, also shared the be-
lief that the morality of citizenship was for many citizens depend-
ent on faith and that the democratic state therefore had a self-
interest in encouraging religious communities of belief.5" I am not
so sure, but they may be right.
Francis Lieber explained this belief more fully."' Anticipating a
point frequently made today by multi-culturalists, he attributed
the success of American democracy to the existence of numerous
social organizations or networks establishing communities of in-
terest in which self-governance was practiced in diverse forms.
These institutions included fraternal orders such as the Rotary,
the Masons, the Elk, and Lions, but also prominent among them
were religious communities.
48. E.g., George Washington, Farewell Address to the People of the United States
(Sept. 9, 1796), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 105-22, at 20 (1998).
49. See 12 STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA
84-86 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Virginia 1823). The Virginia Guarantee of
Religious Liberty, drafted by Jefferson as Governor and later enacted by the legislature in
1781, provided:
That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship,
place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or
burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his
opinion or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to
maintain, their opinion in matters of religion and that the same shall in no-
wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.
Id. at 86.
50. See ALAN R. JONES, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM OF THOMAS MCINTYRE
COOLEY: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 262-63 (1987); PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 9 (1994) ('The home in which Brandeis grew up was
not one that adhered to formal religion or engaged in religious activities.").
51 See FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GoVERNMENT (1853). Lieber
coined the phrase "hamarchy" to describe this form of self-government, which he consid-
ered to be far more stable on account of its internal structures for much the same reasons
that federalism has stabilizing effects.
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American democracy, including the republican idea of the First
Amendment expressed by Milton, found many of its roots in Prot-
estantism. One of the ways in which communities of faith share
their beliefs and values is to express them in political discourse.52
In some sense, membership in subordinate communities, includ-
ing those of faith, gives meaning in this way to the exercise of the
franchise. Moreover, while there have been epochs of severe re-
ligious intolerance, most religions teach, in some form, the idea of
the brotherhood of man as the essential truth on which demo-
cratic citizenship must rest. This is not to say that nonbelievers
cannot be good citizens of a republic, but that their citizenship
rests on a concern for and respect of their fellow citizens that is at
least akin to core religious teaching. A society bereft of that idea
of citizenship (as Rome, for example, was in its days of empire
when citizenship became merely an emblem of membership in a
ruling class) seems doomed to become the war of all against all in
which democratic government is destined to be among the first
casualties.
This belief in a linkage between religion and democracy was
shared by thoughtful secular observers from Jefferson to Bran-
deis, and there is no evidence to falsify it. It ought also to be rec-
ognized that Justices and intellectuals who suppose that "the dis-
semination of science" is a "sufficient agent" of civic moral
education to sustain a community capable of self-government53
comprise a "culture of disbelief'54 that competes with faith. If dis-
belief has become the dogma of the republic, those who nurture
religious faith and whose conduct as citizens is in part informed
by their faith are being made an embattled minority55 not far dif-
ferent from those minorities the Court presumes to protect by its
habits of "strict scrutiny."
52. My colleague, Martin Golding, has explained this relationship for orthodox Jews.
Martin Golding, Tikkun Olam: Social Responsibility, in JEWISH THOUGHT AND LAW 201,
209-14 (D. Schatz et al. eds., 1997) (explaining how general consensus reached in public
debate cannot so easily be obtained by Orthodox Jews for both religious and cultural rea-
sons).
53. Thomas K. Lindsay, Defending Liberalism, 82 IOWA L. REV. 943 (1997) (reviewing
STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
(1995)).
54. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
55. STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM WILLIMON, WHERE RESIDENT ALIENS LIVE:
EXERCISES FOR CHRISTIAN PRACTICE COLONY 25 (1989) ("By being adopted to be part of a
journey called discipleship, Christians are permanently ill at ease in the world.")
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There is no principle of natural law by which the line between
church and state can be judged." Most controversial of the
Court's decisions in this area is that restricting prayer in
schools,57 a stricture that often has been defied. There is no ques-
tion that a requirement that public school children participate in
faith-specific religious services is an offense against the core val-
ues of the First Amendment. But the Fourteenth Amendment is
not a commission to the Court to stamp out every religious im-
pulse manifested by public institutions. Providing textbooks to
students in parochial schools" is probably bad policy, but the con-
stitutional values at issue are at most minimal and, as the Court
with manifest reluctance acknowledged, do not call for the appli-
cation of the federal judiciary's heavy hand.59 Likewise, the
lighting of a Christmas tree on the courthouse lawn alongside a
creche and Chanukah menorah6 ° is in poor taste, but it hardly
threatens the values of religious freedom and free public dis-
course.6 Those who are offended are not without recourse to local
politics and state law, including state amendable constitutions,
and they have the option of "averting their eyes."'
A current issue is whether it violates the First Amendment for
a local school board to post the Ten Commandments in a public
school facility.63 I was once an elected member of a school board
and resisted the presentation of a prayer at the beginning of our
public meetings. I would never have voted to post the Ten Com-
mandments in a public school. However, the posting of such a
message seems to me to be a far cry from conducting a sectarian
prayer in the classroom, or even from uttering a benediction at a
school board meeting.
Among my pro bono ACLU clients years ago was an Ypsilanti,
Michigan schoolteacher who encouraged his students to use his
56. See Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church
and State, 97 COLUMi. L. REV. 2255, 2332 (1997).
57. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,430 (1962).
58. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 603 (1971).
59. But cf id. at 625 (holding that two state statutes authorizing state aid to church-
related educational institutions violate the First Amendment).
60. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
61. But ef id. at 579 (holding the public display of the creche unconstitutional).
62. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
63. See, e.g., Doe v. Harlan County Sch. Dist., 96 F. Supp. 2d 667, 672-78 (E.D. Ky.
2000) (ruling that the Ten Commandments should be removed from display in county
schools).
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classroom bulletin board for expressing their political ideas.
Among the ideas they chose to express was that the local police
were pigs. He was fired for refusing to remove that message from
his bulletin board in support of his students' right to express
themselves. Suppose he allowed a student to post the Ten Com-
mandments. Suppose he posted them himself. Could or should he
be fired for doing so? Maybe he should be, or maybe he should not
be subject to any constraint that is based on the content of his
postings, but the question seems to be at least close enough that
it ought to be resolved (as it was in Ypsilanti) by vote of persons
who are politically accountable, or possibly in state court pursu-
ant to state law, and not by persons appointed in Washington
who have tenure for life and no explicit commission to decide such
matters.
To be sure, for the school board to post the Ten Command-
ments on a classroom bulletin board gives them a sort of official
imprimatur that does not exist when the person posting them is a
teacher or a student. Still, it would seem that anyone offended by
the posting could avert his or her eyes at least as easily as one
could ignore the statement "Fuck the Draft" embroidered on a
jacket.64 And they have recourse to the ballot box and the state
courts. They, too, do not need the foreign aid of the federal judici-
ary to protect themselves from so inconsequential an affront.
Similarly, it seems to me that anyone offended by the words
"With God All Things Are Possible" on a granite plaza next to a
state capitol can be asked to avert his or her eyes. A panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently has
held that such an entablature of the state motto of Ohio violates
the First Amendment." In order to take offense, one would have
to know the Bible well enough to know that Christ is said to have
uttered those words,66 but not well enough to recognize that the
words are taken out of context by Ohio to communicate a non-
sectarian optimism identical to that expressed in the more fa-
miliar expression, "In God We Trust," appearing on our dollar
bills. Had the state of Ohio been so gauche as to engrave "Jesus
64. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (stating that "[tihose in the Los Angeles courthouse
could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their
eyes" from the language on the jacket).
65. ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 727 (6th Cir.
2000).
66. Matthew 19:26 (Good News Bible).
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Saves" on a wall, the court might indeed reasonably conclude that
Ohio had "cross[ed] the line from evenhandedness toward all re-
ligions to a preference for christianity." 7 But it is simply perverse
to derive a sectarian message from those six words standing alone
as a motto, and life-tenured judges are not warranted in imposing
their perverse interpretation on them. Were I a legislator voting
on a state motto, I would vote against that one, not because it
mentions God or is known to the devout student of the New Tes-
tament as a quotation of Christ, but because it strikes me as
somewhat sappy. But then what is a state motto supposed to be? I
am gratified that the case is being reheard by the Court of Ap-
peals en banc.6"
What I have said bears also on the more difficult issue involv-
ing prayers at high school graduations or football games. Re-
cently, a Santa Fe, Texas high school (note the name of the com-
munity: Spanish for "holy faith!") was forbidden to allow its
students to elect by secret ballot classmates to present an invoca-
tion at its football games.69 A person of faith attending such
events might regard specific utterances (we do not know what the
students might have said had they been allowed to speak because
the Court imposed a prior restraint!) as sacrilegious; those who
objected to them on that ground might possibly have a point wor-
thy of scrutiny under the First Amendment. However, the school
board's proposed practice might also be a lesson in democracy.
Those who take offense have the privilege of silently or boister-
ously sneering at the invocation. They can vote for different
speakers or for a different school board. In doing so, they would
be striving to create a community that celebrates the values ex-
pressed in the First Amendment. Or they could sue in state court.
Instead, they sought and received the foreign aid of distant Jus-
tices who, as the dissenters observed, "bristle[] with hostility to
all things religious in public life."7"
When a state seriously tries to establish a state religion, of the
sort Connecticut imposed on its citizens until 1817,7 it will be
time for the Supreme Court to occupy itself with the relationship
67. Capitol Square Review, 210 F.3d at 726.
68. ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., No. 98-4106, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16276, at *1 (6th Cir. July 14, 2000).
69. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2282-83 (2000).
70. Id. at 2283 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
7L See RICHARD J. PURCELL, CONNECTICUT IN TRANSITION, 1775-1818 (1963).
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of state and local government with religion. Requiring sectarian
prayer seems close enough to such an event to warrant the
Court's attention. But it trivializes that important restraint for
the federal judiciary to involve itself in micromanagement of that
relationship.
V. SYMBOLIC SPEECH
The Court also has used the First Amendment to control ac-
tions of state and local governments deterring deeds denoted by
the actors as symbolic speech. Much conduct signals thoughts or
feelings and can therefore be identified as symbolizing speech; in-
deed, having abandoned the distinction between words and deeds,
the Court has cloaked a wide range of wordless conduct with a
claim to First Amendment protection from the efforts of state or
local government to discourage deeds that many citizens regard
as harmful. Responsibility for drawing the line between deeds
having symbolic importance that a democratic society ought to
tolerate from those that do not has been relocated from demo-
cratic government to the federal judiciary.
The obscurity of the issue is illustrated by the limited right to
dance nude. The Court has allowed the states to require barroom
dancers to wear G-strings and pasties.72 It is a reasonable infer-
ence from these opinions that absolutely buck-naked dancing in a
barroom is not a constitutionally protected right, although nu-
merous Justices have thought that it is. It is also a reasonable in-
ference from these decisions that the Court would not allow a
state to require G-strings and pasties if the dancers were engaged
in what the Court deemed to be serious art such as that per-
formed by the New York City Ballet. Finally, it also appears that
public nudity for some nonartistic purpose, whether to show off
the superiority of one's "private parts" or to exhibit one's con-
tempt for their viewers, may be punished under state laws pro-
hibiting public nudity. These distinctions are not coherent.3
Their administration requires determinations of fact regarding
the purpose of the nudity and the setting in which it occurs, so
72. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 120 S. Ct. 1382, 1395-98 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Thea-
tre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560, 571 (1991). But see Schultz v. City of Cumberland, Nos. 98-4126 &
98-4209, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23773, at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 26, 2000).
73. See Pap's AM., 120 S. Ct. at 1406 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that one can be said to have a right to practice as much nudity as
the federal judiciary approves in a given case. One may perhaps
wonder what the Court will decide when it is confronted with The
Naked Truth, a program featuring announcers who strip while
reading the evening news on network television.v4
The right to be nude is not, all things considered, a very impor-
tant individual right. A community might suspect that the nudity
even of classical ballet dancers is less a means of expression than
a means of attracting an audience of paying voyeurs whose hu-
man frailties are being exploited for lucre. A wise community
would nevertheless tolerate most presentations of nudity whether
or not the actions were intended to communicate an idea or a
feeling, as long as the nudity did not occasion serious offense to
others or otherwise cause public disorder. At the same time, a
wise community might conclude, along with virtually every other
human culture ever sustained on the planet, that maintaining a
measure of privacy for one's genitals tends to promote desirable
civil decorum and therefore should be encouraged by the law.
Many years ago, I represented eighteen actors who appeared
nude on a public stage. I can say from personal knowledge that
my clients stripped because, and only because, they had been un-
able to draw a sufficient audience when they performed clothed.
Maybe their nudity enhanced their artistic expression, but I
doubt it. I won all eighteen cases, making me one of the most suc-
cessful nudity lawyers of all time. My argument, never answered
by the prosecutor, was that the Michigan law did not apply to
nude dancing in a theatre. I believe that the same result would,
and should, accrue in most states.
However, I share the view expressed in Justice Scalia's concur-
rence in Barnes v. Glen Theatre7" that laws generally constraining
public nudity are not properly subject to any form of scrutiny un-
der the First Amendment.7" If the city fathers of Erie perceive
pasties to be needed for the moral health of their city, it is no
business of life-tenured federal judges to tell them that they are
mistaken in that assessment. And if the City of New York were so
74. This happens on Channel M1 in Moscow. See Michael Wines, So the News Is Ho-
Hum. The Show's Spectacular, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2000, at A4.
75. 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
76. See also Pap's AM., 120 S. Ct. at 1400-02 (citing Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 574 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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foolish as to prosecute a ballet company for performing in the
buff, it would be sufficient to resolve the issue by democratic
means or by the intervention of state courts. That last example is,
of course, a merely imaginary horrible scenario. We do not need
the federal judiciary to protect us from such impossibilities.
Constitutional protection for the burning of crosses 7 is another
example of First Amendment hypertrophy. A state or city could
reasonably perceive that such a gesture is an intimidation and a
provocation to violence, with no visible redeeming value. If there
are people who want to burn crosses, they can vote to throw out
the rascals who would punish them for doing so.
And then there is flag burning.7 Not only are citizens entitled
to withhold their respect for national symbols, but the Court has
proclaimed the individual's right to destroy our national icons.79
Many believe that ceremonial honor to the symbols of the Repub-
lic is an important means of reinforcing civic virtue."0 That belief,
like the belief that religion is good for a democratic polity, cannot
be falsified. It is often intensely felt by those who have risked
their lives or lost loved ones to protect the Republic symbolized by
the flag. The act of burning a symbol so cherished by persons ex-
pected to view the act is an unmistakably hostile act having tan-
gible and potentially harmful consequences even if it also serves
to express hostile sentiments. The competing interest of the flag
burner is insubstantial. There are an almost infinite number of
other methods of expressing his hostility to the commonwealth.
What is one person's benign symbolic expression is another's
hostile deed. Is a community constitutionally forbidden to dis-
courage the wearing of the Confederate flag as an intentional af-
front to African-American citizens, or of Swastikas worn to en-
courage anti-Semitism? Or might it be constitutionally entitled to
77. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (holding that an ordi-
nance prohibiting the display of symbols that, based on race, may alarm others is invalid
under the First Amendment).
78. See generally Kenneth D. Ward, Free Speech and the Development of Liberal Vir-
tues: An Examination of the Controversies Involving Flag-Burning and Hate Speech, 52 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 733 (1998).
79. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding that burning the Ameri-
can flag is expressive conduct that the First Amendment protects).
80. Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the U.S. Authorizing Congress to
Prohibit the Physical Desecration of the Flag of the U.S.: Hearing on H.R. 54 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Prof. Richard D. Parker,
Harvard Univ.).
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forbid the display of the Stars and Stripes as a local protest
against national policy? Wisdom decrees tolerance in all such
matters, but it is the tolerance of the community that matters,
and little of that is gained by federal decrees.
The flag burning decision has evoked a vigorous effort to
amend the Constitution, which has some chance of success. What
a trivial amendment! But it would be a measured response to an
intervention by the Court to forbid a trivial trespass on the indi-
vidual's right to engage in symbolic anti-symbolism.
VI. THE RIGHT TO DISSOCIATE
In the same vein, there is unseemliness in the Court's fash-
ioning a constitutional right of the Boy Scouts to exclude homo-
sexual scoutmasters.8' No doubt this is an important issue for
those committed to the scouting movement, an institution de-
voted to the moral development of youth. 2 The Scouts may be
right to suppose that many parents would withdraw their chil-
dren from the movement if it appeared to shelter leaders prosely-
tizing for homosexual lifestyles. 3 Wise law might well leave those
leading the scouting movement free to make the appropriate ac-
commodations according to their own lights.
But is such wisdom constitutionally required? Might a state or
community reasonably follow the course of protecting gay and
lesbian citizens from discrimination by institutions such as the
Scouts? Particularly at a time when sexual mores are changing,
there is much to be said for allowing states to experiment with
diverse policies in the manner long advocated by Justice Bran-
deis,' especially when an experiment has no significant extrater-
ritorial effects. There is a genuine collision of moral values, and
one might therefore think its resolution an appropriate matter for
democratic self-government.
81. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2457 (2000).
82. See id. at 2451-52.
83. Cf id. at 2453 (stating that the Boy Scouts expressed, in a position statement, its
current view that -i[t]he Boy Scouts of America has always reflected the expectations that
Scouting families have had for the organization. We do not believe that homosexuals pro-
vide a role model consistent with these expectations.'").
84. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) ('There must be
power in the States and the Nation to remould, through experimentation, our economic
practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs.") (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
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However, the Court boldly disempowered the state of New Jer-
sey from pursuing a policy of anti-discrimination on the ground
that it offends the Scouts' right of association embedded in the
First Amendment. To find this restraint in the text of the First
Amendment is more than a stretch; the right of association is it-
self a strained inference from the text, but there has never before
been a right to associate for the purpose of achieving discrimina-
tion against embattled groups." The New Jersey law that the
Court invalidated can hardly be viewed as an expression of ma-
joritarian tyranny indifferent to the interest and welfare of a be-
leaguered minority represented by the Scouts. The Scouts have
full recourse to the political process to correct the problem if in-
deed the people of New Jersey perceive that there is one. The Su-
preme Court of New Jersey concluded that there was none.
VII. COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING
Another, and even more misguided, excursion is the Court's ex-
tension of the First Amendment to commercial advertising.86 Un-
til the advent of the Burger Court, it was assumed that commer-
cial advertising was unprotected by constitutional entitlements."
Advertising, to resort to Milton, has nothing to do with conscience
and very little to do with truth. Nevertheless, the Court's present
doctrine is that advertising that is not demonstrably false or de-
ceptive and that does not concern unlawful activities may be re-
stricted only in the service of a substantial public interest.88 This
standard appears to disempower states and communities from
dealing with a considerable range of highly debatable conduct by
which some individuals seek to profit from the inattentiveness or
lack of sophistication of consumers of goods and services.
A useful illustration of the difficulties with the Court's stan-
85. Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (arguing that a
state's "compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens justi-
fies the impact" on a private organization's "male members' associational freedoms").
86. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Cmty. Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(holding that commercial speech deserved the protection of the First Amendment).
87. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1941) (holding that an ordinance
forbidding the use of handbills for advertising did not violate the handbiller's constitu-
tional rights).
88. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
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dard is the problem of lawyer advertising.89 Even simple price ad-
vertising by lawyers often threatens to mislead because of the ab-
sence of any means to provide information about the relative
quality or utility of the service that a lawyer seeks to sell. There
is also a public interest of ancient dignity expressed in laws
against champerty and barratry that accords with widely shared
moral judgment in forestalling activities seeking to cause or per-
petuate civil disputes. While it is fairly contended that much liti-
gation is in the public interest and ought to be promoted, there
are many claims that potential plaintiffs are ill-advised to assert,
not only because they lack merit, but also because the transaction
cost, in heartache as well as treasure, makes their assertion im-
provident even if successful. Any experienced lawyer is ac-
quainted with instances in which considerable public and private
expense was incurred in litigation, foreseeably to the benefit of no
person except the lawyers; indeed, an Italian proverb has it that
"a lawsuit is a fruit tree planted in a lawyer's garden."9" Moreo-
ver, the public has a special claim to regulate lawyers to prevent
the degradation of the profession by excessive commercialism. 9'
This is so because trust in lawyers is a public resource affecting
the trust in other institutions of the Republic.92 In addition, law-
yer advertising appears to have strengthened a tendency for re-
munerative law practice, like other commercial enterprises, to be
concentrated in fewer hands so that considerations of economic
policy also are entailed.
Whether, despite all these concerns, lawyer advertising is on
balance useful and whether or to what extent its regulation is
warranted are questions eminently suited to resolution by officers
entrusted to decide them by the people through conventional
democratic institutions. There is no reason to suppose that na-
tional uniformity is useful. Life-tenured judges, however educated
and experienced, have no special qualifications to appraise the is-
sues.
Yet, the Supreme Court has steadily enlarged the constitu-
89. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
90. illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, 55 F.R.D. 221, 224 (N.D. ill. 1972).
91. But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Russell G. Pearce & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Why Lawyers
Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1084 (1983); FTC, REPORT ON LAWYER ADVERTISING (1984).
92. Carl M. Selinger, The Public's Interest in Preserving the Dignity and Unity of the
Legal Profession, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861, 872 (1997).
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tional inhibition93 to extend to direct, personal, uninvited solicita-
tion of business by certified public accountants 94 and, presuma-
bly, by lawyers as well. These holdings have made it very difficult
if not impossible for the state to protect citizens from invasive
selling of expensive professional services that the consumer may
not need. The Court's earlier concern that a hard-selling profes-
sional person might overbear a less sophisticated and vulnerable
potential client 95 seems to have vanished.
This disregard for the public interest in protecting citizens
from misleading salesmanship is even more evident when the ad-
vertising in question is employed by those who seek to profit from
the gullibility of consumers of diverse health remedies, a large
group of citizens that may be especially in need of protection from
the mendacity of many vendors. Consistent with utterances of the
Supreme Court,96 lower federal courts have held that vendors of
health foods and dietetic supplements have a constitutional right
to present their wares as healthful as long as their labels disclose
in the fine print that there is no scientific evidence to support
their claims.97 It also has been held that manufacturers of pre-
scription drugs have a constitutional right to advise doctors of
uses of their drugs that have not been evaluated by the Food and
Drug Administration.9 Indeed, as Margaret Gilhooley has ob-
served, food and drug law is increasingly a subdivision of First
Amendment law.99 The effect is to turn the clock back a century to
provide substantial freedom to the purveyors of useless and po-
tentially harmful snake oil that progressive consumer protection
law sought long ago to drive out of the marketplace.
93. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91
(1990); Shapiro v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
94. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
95. E.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
96. Cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996) (holding that the
state cannot prohibit liquor advertising). Of course, the state can eliminate all private
sales of liquor, but cannot allow private sales without advertising. This result can seem
sensible only to one who has become lost in the wilderness of First Amendment doctrine.
97. E.g., Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999). For background on
this problem, see generally H.R. REP. No. 101-980 (1990) ("FDA's Continuing Failure to
Prevent Deceptive Health Claims for Food").
98. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74-75 (D.D.C. 1999), appeal
dismissed and order vacated, Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
99. See Margaret Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Food and Drug Law, 74 TUL. L. REV.
815, 823-24 (2000).
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The problem with respect to lawyer, accountant, and health
food advertising is that all are instruments for exploitation of
citizens who do not have means or occasion for evaluating the in-
formation that vendors supply. Consumer protection law (and in-
vestor protection law) in virtually all its forms rests on an intui-
tively based assumption that many vendors of goods and services
will stay up nights thinking of ways to catch consumers (or inves-
tors) in unguarded moments when they can be separated from
their money by suggestions that they might gain happiness by
unlikely means remunerative to the vendors. Overt and demon-
strable fraud is only the most blatant form of exploitation. All of
us at times, and some of us all of the time, are vulnerable to sub-
tle and optimistic suggestion that a manufactured substance (or a
service) might improve our health, wealth, appearance, or dispo-
sition.
Consumer and investor protection law cannot protect us from
calculated exploitation of that common human weakness without
imposing restraints on what vendors can say. As Kathleen Sulli-
van has observed, the Court has made all consumer protection
law "much harder to defend."' ° Of course, there are some utter-
ances by vendors that have genuine value to consumers. But
there is no reason to believe that federal judges are better able
than legislators or administrators to distinguish good commercial
advertising from bad. Nor is there reason to suppose that the
value of the information we receive from good advertising out-
weighs the harm caused by advertising that "pushes the enve-
lope" of truth to gain profit. For example, the harms caused by
medical advertising include misplaced reliance on a useless rem-
edy, failure to secure real help that might be available, and occa-
sional unanticipated toxic effects of the snake oil bought and con-
sumed.
Unlike other matters discussed here, this extension of the First
Amendment to food and drug law is not an intrusion on state or
local law. With respect to the advertising of health foods and
medicines, primary reliance of consumers for protection has
rested on the federal government because of the inability of state
and local governments to regulate the distribution of goods mov-
100. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes and Free Speech: The Implications
of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 155; see also Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Adver-
tising and the First Amendment, 81 IOwA L. REV. 589 (1996).
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ing in interstate and international commerce and because of the
high cost of scientific investigation of claims made for products.''
For similar reasons, many foreign governments and even the
World Health Organization also rely on the United States Food
and Drug Administration. 2 It is not merely American citizens
who are exposed to exploitation when the United States Food and
Drug Administration is restrained, but people in all corners of the
world.
If lawyers and vendors of ineffective and possibly harmful
remedies have a constitutionally protected right to advertise, a
compelling argument can be made for a constitutionally protected
right to beg. 3 Recognition of such a right would entail a Court-
crafted law of vagrancy equally suitable for application to every
community, neighborhood, and street in the United States. Hu-
mane consideration of the needs and interests of the most impov-
erished citizens is as important as any of the values enshrined in
the Constitution, at least equal to those noted in the preceding
pages, but it would be improvident of the Court to take upon itself
the responsibility for controlling the means by which those needs
and interests ought to be considered and recognized. However, if
professional ethics law and food and drug law are branches of
First Amendment law, why not vagrancy law? At least the federal
courts enforcing such constitutional law would be protecting the
powerless rather than those who have abundant resources by
which to protect themselves in democratic political struggles.
VIII. CAMPAIGN FINANCE
The most grave example (in this author's mind) of the Court's
hubris in extending the First Amendment to matters that are not
its business is the Court-created right to spend money to influ-
ence and sometimes to control the result of ostensibly democratic
elections. 4 It is this that has led me to this reconsideration of the
101. See generally FOOD AND DRUG LAW (Richard M. Cooper ed., 1991).
102. See generally JAVED SIDDIQI, WORLD HEALTH AND WORLD POLITICS: THE WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND THE UN SYSTEM (1995).
103. Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and
the Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 900 (1990) (relating the right to commercial
speech with the right to beg).
104. See generally ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT
WENT WRONG AND WHY (2000).
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Court's other dogmatic extensions of the First Amendment. In-
deed, a cynic could see in the Court's decisions on campaign fi-
nance a malicious purpose to so degrade democracy that the peo-
ple have no choice but to rely on the Court to govern us as a
tenured College of Cardinals.
While many of us are willing to supply small sums of money to
support a political cause, the common understanding is that large
political contributions are generally made in expectation of a quid
pro quo from the recipient. There have been occasions when
wealthy persons acting in what they perceived to be a public
spirit have financed an expensive campaign because they believed
in a cause or in the moral worth of an individual candidate. But
many campaign contributions, we cannot know how many, are
repaid out of public stock in the form of special consideration in
lawmaking or enforcement.
For example, it is the frequent practice of many firms and per-
sons of means to contribute substantial sums to rival candidates
so that whichever candidate wins, the donor wins. On the face of
it, such contributors are expressing no idea and favoring no policy
other than preferential treatment for particular interests they fa-
vor. Perhaps the clearest example of the evil is the federal sub-
sidy to sugar growers, which serves no imaginable public purpose,
but lines the pockets of a few families who subsidize the political
campaigns of many, many legislators on both sides of any aisle.105
Other generous patrons of rival political campaigns include gam-
bling casinos, tobacco companies, highway contractors, and real
estate developers, none of whom can be suspected of spending to
promote any policy other than their own financial self-interest.
A state or community is legitimately concerned with the avail-
ability of its political process for the open encounter of ideas
praised by Milton. A process in which one side of a debate is given
by far the largest share of exposure to the public is not a fair con-
test on a level playing field. It is at best a Lincoln-Douglas debate
with little or no Lincoln. Manifestly, fairness in this context is not
easily defined or achieved, but that is a reason to allow con-
straints that the people of a state or community might choose to
impose on persons who seek to use money to dominate public dis-
105. Cf. Richard K Harper & John Aldrich, The Political Economy of Sugar Legisla-
tion, 70 PUB. CHOICE 299, 300-01 (1991) (contending that the federal subsidy to sugar
growers is not economically feasible).
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course with glitzy, glib, misleading sound bites crafted by profes-
sional deceivers.
The Court in its treatment of the issues in its widely dispar-
aged opinion in Buckley v. Valeo °6 acknowledged the risk of brib-
ery as a justification for the regulation of campaign funding.10 7
What the Court and advocates such as the Wall Street Journal
editorialists' have not acknowledged is the marginally more
subtle form of corruption achieved by monied interests who buy
not the officer but the office, assuring themselves that it will be
occupied by a person reliably friendly to their interests. While
vast expenditures of interest group money are not an absolute as-
surance of success, there are few elected offices in the United
States government that a citizen who does not have access to very
large sums might hope to occupy. That is also true of most state
offices. This is a profoundly disaffecting reality.
The problem of campaign finance was a problem in earlier
times, but it did not become acute until the advent of television.
The electronic media are capable of providing a blitzkrieg of po-
litical advertising, but only for a high price paid not only to the
media but to consultants who are expert in the relevant arts of
misguidance. Political advertising on commercial television is
much more effective, and much more pernicious, than any other
form of campaigning because the disinformation, supplied
through sonorous and artistic spot advertisements broadcast be-
tween innings or between soap opera conversations, "melts down"
in the minds of viewers, even sophisticated viewers, who are
prone to forget its unreliable source and attribute it to a reliable
one.
0 9
The result of such an insidious electronic blitzkrieg, or even the
possible threat of a blitzkrieg, because of its effectiveness, is to
impose a similar cost on rival candidates. Indeed, candidates face
a prisoner's dilemma compelling them to resort to high-tech,
high-cost, negative campaigning. To compete for many public of-
fices, the serious office seeker therefore is compelled to do what-
106. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
107. Id. at 45.
108. E.g., 'Loose Enterprise?,' WALL ST. J., July 27, 2000, at A22.
109. The process is analyzed in KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS 43-63
(1992). See generally JOSEPH A. CAPPELLA & KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, SPIRAL OF
CYNICISM: THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (1997).
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ever is necessary to secure a large campaign fund. Not just
money, but big money, has truly become the mother's milk of poli-
tics. n
°
Justice Stevens has recently expressed the correct premise of
First Amendment doctrine applicable to campaign finance.
"Money," he said, "is property; it is not speech."n1
Speech has the power to inspire volunteers to perform a multitude of
tasks on a campaign trail, on a battleground, or even on a football
field. Money, meanwhile, has the power to pay hired laborers to per-
form the same tasks. It does not follow, however, that the First
Amendment provides the same measure of protection to the use of
money to accomplish such oals as it provides to the use of ideas to
achieve the same results.1
n
Justice Byron White expressed a similar thought in his dissent
in Buckley."' Alas, that his brethren did not heed his words; one
may hope they may in time heed those of Justice Stevens.
They have been encouraged to do so by Burt Neuborne, who
advocates a "democracy-centered" reading of the First Amend-
ment."4 Indeed, the problem of campaign finance lies at the cen-
ter of the First Amendment's historic preoccupation with the pro-
tection of political utterances. As Milton understood, a republic
requires debate for its very life. When incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment, the First Amendment can be rightly viewed
as having a direct connection to the constitutional guarantee of a
republican form of government. It is then also linked to the Equal
Protection Clause and the rightly celebrated doctrine of one man,
one vote.
Thus seen, the right to express oneself by hiring others to
speak must yield to the imperative need to level the playing field
so that citizens of modest means can participate in self-
government on reasonably equal terms with individuals or groups
of abundant means. When large sums of money are used to hire
110. CHARLES LEWIS, THE BUYING OF THE CONGRESS: How SPECIAL INTERESTS HAVE
STOLEN YOUR RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 1-12 (1998); Lars-
Erik Nelson, Democracy for Sale, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Dec. 3, 1998, at 8.
111. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 910 (2000) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
112. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
113. 424 U.S. at 257 (White, J., dissenting).
114. Burt Neuborne, Soft Landings, in IF BucKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT
BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 169 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed., 1999).
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others to express, publish, or broadcast in insidious form ideas
that they may or may not share to audiences who do not choose to
receive them, much more than debate is involved. The guarantee
of a republican form of government is out the window, and in its
place is a First Amendment guarantee of a plutocratic form of
government subservient to the interests of wealth, which is the
form of government now prevailing in America.
The problem of campaign finance is most acute with respect to
the judicial elections that are my special concern. In such elec-
tions, voter interest is generally low, political content is limited,
and the appearance, if not the risk, of quasi-bribery to secure pre-
ferred treatment is especially great. Nevertheless, since the
1980s, multimillion dollar campaign funds are required to secure
election to some states' highest courts."5 Citizens are not wrong
to doubt the independence of the judiciary in such circumstances.
The practice is a fulfillment of the cynical view expressed in pub-
lic choice theory that elected judges are virtually indistinguish-
able from legislators in their vote-maximizing behavior." 6
Any effort to regulate campaign finance must also confront an-
other questionable application of the First Amendment: the
Court's holdings that there is in at least some circumstances a
constitutional right to engage in politics anonymously."7 Often
suggested by those who oppose more effective regulation of cam-
paign finance is public disclosure of sources. There are numerous
practical problems with this approach that seem likely to make it
ineffective, but even that is subject to objection cloaked in the
rhetoric of the First Amendment. Supreme Court cases affirming
the right to anonymity are distinguishable on their facts, but
given the manifest predisposition of the Court to favor the rights
of wealthy citizens or groups to dominate political discourse with
their money, the Court might perhaps be expected to hold that a
billionaire citizen or group is constitutionally entitled to saturate
115. See, e.g., Kurt M. Brauer, The Role of Campaign Fundraising in Michigan's Su-
preme Court Elections: Should We Throw the Baby out with the Bathwater?, 44 WAYNE L.
REV. 367 (1998); Paul D. Carrington, Big Money in Texas Judicial Elections: The Sickness
and Its Remedies, 53 SMU L. REV. 263 (2000); Nathan S. Heffernan, Judicial Responsibil-
ity, Judicial Independence and the Election of Judges, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1031 (1997);
Glenn C. Noe, Alabama Judicial Selection Reform: A Skunk in Tort Hell, 28 CUMB. L. REV.
215 (1998).
116. Richard L. Hasen, "High Court Wrongly Elected":" A Public Choice Model of Judg-
ing and Its Implications for the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1313 (1997).
117. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
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anonymously our airwaves with costly and misleading political
advertising as one appears to have done in a recent presidential
primary.
A reasonable citizen might well wonder: if people have the
right to use money anonymously to buy influence with a legisla-
ture, why should they not be equally entitled to buy influence
with a court, or even the Supreme Court, that claims the power to
move the issue of campaign finance beyond the reach of demo-
cratic political discourse? Frederick Grimke noted long ago that
all the arguments for life tenure for judges are nearly equally ap-
plicable to legislators and executives." 8 One response to the con-
cerns I express would be to amend Article III to require the Jus-
tices to stand for re-election every six years or so in a free-for-all
campaign requiring those wishing to remain on the bench to raise
millions of dollars a year from interest groups, litigants, and law-
yers appearing before the Court to enable themselves to calumni-
ate their political adversaries. At least one could then be assured
that those making decisions about the constitutionality of cam-
paign finance laws really understood what was at stake.
IX. DEFAMATION AND THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
IN BROADCAST REGULATION
The problem of campaign finance is further compounded by
what the Court has done with the law of defamation." 9 The not-
so-hypothetical anonymous billionaire may perhaps safely satu-
rate our airwaves with material that stops just short of blatant
defamation of a disfavored candidate.
The holding in New York Times v. Sullivan2 ' that a public offi-
cial must prove malice by clear and convincing evidence to re-
cover for alleged defamation uttered in public debate 2' did not
anticipate our vast postmodern abilities to publish derogatory
material requiring a victimized candidate (if he or she is to sur-
vive the assault) promptly to refute it and to have on hand the
large sums required for effective refutation when an election is
118. See FREDERICK GRIMKE, THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE INSTITUTIONS 444
(John William Ward ed., 1968) (1856).
119. See generally RODNEYA. SMOLLA, SUINGTHE PRESS (1986).
120. 376 U.S. 274 (1964).
121. Id. at 279-80.
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imminent.122 Nor does it take account of the cumulative impact of
decades of intensely negative campaigning on the feelings of citi-
zens toward the governments for which they share nominal re-
sponsibility or on the willingness of able citizens to stand for elec-
tion.
There now seem to be those spending vast sums not to per-
suade voters to support the candidate of the big spenders but to
so despoil the process that many voters will stay home on election
day, a choice that a growing number of citizens have been mak-
ing. Civility in democratic politics is at best rare, but it is a
priceless asset worth seeking. To many, and perhaps most,
American voters, it is made to appear that most electoral choices
are choices among scoundrels.
If civility in elections is not a constitutionally legitimate objec-
tive of legislation, then it would seem that civility in judicial pro-
ceedings is equally unsuited to legislative concern. If one can
freely accuse a candidate for judicial office of moral transgres-
sions, why may a lawyer or litigant not repeat those accusations
in open court in the course of a jury trial?123 Does a lawyer not
have a First Amendment right to speak her mind and heart when
she is making a closing argument to the jury? Can she not say
that the legal instructions they are about to hear will be given by
a judge whose campaign funds were provided by tobacco compa-
nies and other hateful enterprises?24 Can she not use the same
strong language on her adversary that is used on network televi-
sion or perhaps drape the bench or adversary counsel's table with
a Confederate flag or a Swastika?
Justice Byron White joined in Justice Brennan's sweeping
opinion in Sullivan, but later concluded that it was his worst vote
in thirty years on the Court.125 For many years, he sought oppor-
tunities to restore (without punitive damages) the law of defama-
tion in its application to political discourse.'26 He sensed, as many
did not, that it was a mistake to strip our political discourse of ef-
122. See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1991).
123. Cf In re Green, No. 995A150, 2000 Colo. LEXIS 1034 (Sept. 11, 2000).
124. Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-6 (1981).
125. See DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A
PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 352, 421 (1998).
126. See id. at 352.
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fective restraint on false or misleading information about candi-
dates for public office.'27 He repeatedly affirmed a public need for
a forum in which candidates victimized by political disinforma-
tion could call their unjust assailants to account. 12' He did suc-
ceed in leading the Court to a holding that, notwithstanding Sul-
livan, a knowingly false attribution of a quotation is actionable
defamation.
129
There is no doubt that Sullivan is now deeply entrenched in
our legal and political culture. 3 ° Indeed, at least two American
courts have refused to enforce English judgments imposing li-
ability on foreign publishers who in foreign lands defamed officers
of foreign governments.' 3' These decisions were radical depar-
tures from the recognition customarily given to English judg-
ments in American courts. 32 It is not generally a reason to deny
recognition of a foreign judgment (perhaps least of all that of an
English court) that the law expressed in the judgment is different
from American law, as the English law is on the Sullivan issue."'
It was, however, held that judgments imposing liability on jour-
nalists for defaming public figures so shock the American judicial
conscience that it would be contrary to national policy to enforce
them.'34 Indeed, this acute sensitivity to the presumed virtues of
the Sullivan rule is remarkable given that most, if not all, other
democracies afford their politicians seeking to represent the peo-
ple whatever protection from defamation is afforded other citi-
zens. "'35 By the standards of other civilized societies, the two
127. See id. at 422.
128. See id.
129. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 518 (1991).
130. See generally DONALD M. GiLLMOR, POWER, PuBLICITY, AND THE ABUSE OF LIBEL
LAWS (1992); LucAs A. POwE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS IN AimRICA (1991).
131. See Telnikoffv. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 236 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); Bach-
chan v. India Abroad Pubs., Inc., 585 N.Y. Supp. 2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
132. See, e.g., UNIF. FOREIGN-MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 261
(1968); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 483
(1987).
133. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 274-75.
134. See Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in
Highest State Courts, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 124 ("The right of citi-
zens to defame public officials is now so widely recognized that it has become ingrained in
our legal culture.").
135. Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism, in IF BUCKLEY
FELL, supra note 114, at 103, 119. A proposal for a statutory modification of the Sullivan
rule is set forth in Carrington, supra note 134, at 124.
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judgments were correct on the merits even if their merits cannot
be recognized in the United States.
So far have the federal courts come with this extraordinary
doctrine that it is no longer possible to regard the law of defama-
tion as a serious inhibition on the utterance of misleading or seri-
ously overstated allegations not only against government officers,
but against a host of other "public figures." It is even plausible
that corporate executives are unprotected against false utter-
ances about them that are intended to mislead the stock mar-
ket.13
6
A regulation of the media intended to inhibit uncivil politics
was the fairness doctrine, imposed on television broadcasters by
the Federal Communications Commission. 137 To the great distress
of the media, the Court upheld that doctrine over thirty years
ago.'38 It has since been substantially neglected,'39 and the
Court's holding seems likely to be narrowly confined. But a ray or
two of hope has been opened by the opinions of the Justices in the
cases involving the must-carry provisions of the Cable Act of
1992.140 Those opinions have been analyzed with admirable care
by Owen Fiss, who finds in them some evidence that the Court
may be turning away from extreme libertarianism and might tol-
erate well-crafted regulation of the practices of television and ca-
ble operators to assure equalizing access for political expression
that is presently being drowned out by the paid utterances of
well-funded candidates and interest groups.' Perhaps such
regulation might include some form of a right to reply to at least
some forms of defamatory or seriously misleading political adver-
tising such as most of those provided in sound bites inserted into
commercial television.
136. For a thoughtful analysis of this use of the Internet, see generally Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855
(2000).
137. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1994); 47 C.F.R. 73.1910
(1999) (requiring that broadcasters are obligated to give a reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on public issues).
138. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369, 400-01 (1969).
139. The last vestige of the doctrine was suspended by the Commission on October 4,
2000. Stephen Labaton, In Test, F.C.C. Lifts Requirement on Broadcasting Political Re-
plies, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 5, 2000, at Al.
140. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
141. Owen Fiss, The Censorship of Television, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1215, 1238 (1999).
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On the other hand, the political prospects for such reforms
seem dim. As Cass Sunstein has observed, the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters uses the First Amendment in the way that
the National Rifle Association uses the Second Amendment: "as
an all-purpose shield against any action adverse to their inter-
ests."' Politicians (or Justices) daring to impose any form of ac-
countability on the media must expect to be pilloried for doing so.
The nexus between campaign finance and the absence of the
restraining influence of defamation law has become, in very re-
cent years, an especially acute problem in the conduct of judicial
elections. How indeed can one spend millions of dollars on a judi-
cial campaign other than on false and misleading advertising?
The most common ploy, almost always available for use against a
sitting judge, is to accuse an adversary of being soft on crime.
Since 1996, six states have "create[d] organizations to monitor ju-
dicial elections,' but it is not clear that they will be allowed to
take action against judicial candidates who debase their offices
and their professions by uttering calumnies against one another.
Thus, a United States District Court has enjoined a proceeding of
the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission against Justice Harold
See,"M who spent millions in a campaign for the Republican
nomination for the Chief Justiceship of his court to buy expen-
sively crafted television advertising depicting his adversary as a
judge who was soft on drug dealers.'45 See, who had himself been
falsely vilified in a previous campaign, 4 6 listed among his adver-
sary's drug dealer cases many in which the adversary had not
participated, as See appeared to know. See also surely knew that
his adversary could not explain his current rulings on sentencing
without violating a standard rule of judicial ethics,' so that his
142. Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 499 n.+
(2000).
143. William Glaberson, States to Rein in Truth-Bending in Court Races: Judges Face
Penalties for Deceiving Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2000, at Al.
144. Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, No. 00-D-976-N, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13235, at *1-2 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 3, 2000).
145. Id. at *31 n.18.
146. See Noe, supra note 115, at 216. For Justice See's comments on the law governing
judicial elections, see Harold See, Comment: Judicial Selection and Decisional Independ-
ence, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 141.
147. Butler, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13235, at *37 (providing that the defendants stated
in a court document that "Justice See knew or should have known that Canon 3A(6) pro-
hibited Judge Moore from explaining pending cases."); see ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL
ETHIcs Canon 3A(6) (1976) (amended 1999) (constraining public comment by judges on
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adversary was essentially defenseless against the charge. The
District Court held that the Alabama rule prohibiting a judge
from publishing such false information in a judicial campaign is
substantially likely to be a violation of the First Amendment and
enjoined the disciplinary action taken by the Alabama Judicial
Inquiry Commission.14
The case of Justice See is, alas, one of many. 4 1 In 1998, a
Georgia panel monitoring judicial elections published its finding
that a spot advertisement broadcast by a candidate was highly
misleading and unethical. The candidate lost, perhaps as a result
of this corrective intervention, and has now brought an action
against the commission charging it with a violation of his First
Amendment rights. And there are other pending disputes of a like
kind, arising in Michigan, Nevada, and Florida. 5 °
One must at least give Justice See credit for appearing on
screen and calumniating his adversary in the first person. Per-
haps he could have avoided trouble by arranging to have the
same advertising done at the expense and direction of an anony-
mous supporter, allowing the calumnies to be uttered by an actor
bearing a suitable resemblance to Walter Cronkite. If one is to
believe all one reads in the Supreme Court reports,'5 ' there is
nothing that a state can do to prevent an anonymous source of
wealth (say an organization calling itself War on Drugs) from
calumniating judicial candidates. Such an anonymous source was
single-handedly responsible for the defeat in 1996 of a member of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee.'52 The identities and true mo-
pending matters).
148. Butler, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13235, at *39-40 (finding that "Justice See ha[d]
established a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his claim that Canon 2A
is unconstitutional as applied to him").
149. See Glaberson, supra note 143, at Al (describing Alabama's first disciplinary
charge against a judge and a Florida trial judge's removal as examples of a changing trend
in the attitude toward judges in our country).
150. The breadth of concern over the effect of the inflated First Amendment on the in-
tegrity of judicial elections was revealed by the call of an emergency meeting of fifteen
Chief Justices to discuss the issue and possible remedies. William Glaberson, Chief Jus-
tices to Meet on Abuses in Judicial Races, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2000, at Al.
151. Cf McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding that a
state cannot outlaw speech based on its potentially fraudulent content). That case involved
an unsigned flyer circulated by the author at a public meeting; it could be readily distin-
guished from any case involving electronic advertising.
152. An account of the 1996 Tennessee election is provided in Stephen B. Bright, Politi-
cal Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove
Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 310 (1997). See also
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tives of her assailants may never be revealed, and it may be that
the state is constitutionally disabled from investigating and pub-
licizing them.
I have observed a tendency in some life-tenured judges and
persons holding academic tenure to dismiss concern for any
problems with judicial elections, many of them reckoning that
there is an easy answer to the problem: just appoint state court
judges, like federal judges, for life. This is not the place to debate
the merits of judicial elections, 53 but the point needs to be made
that judicial elections are here to stay in most states. 54 There are
legitimate, if not universally convincing, arguments for holding
such elections. It is therefore a matter of paramount importance
to the law that those elections being held be free of fraud and
other electoral abuses, including factual distortions to make a ri-
val candidate appear to be a scoundrel. While the difference be-
tween judicial elections and other kinds of elections is perhaps a
matter only of degree, there is a distinction to be made with re-
spect to the relative importance of civility and personal integrity
of those elected to judicial office and, indeed, of the appearance of
integrity needed to sustain public confidence in law.
X. THE MEDIA AND TBE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
The hyperinflation of the First Amendment that is ravaging
our politics and our judicial institutions reflects the excessive
power that barons of the media exercise over American politics
and law. The barons long ago outgrew any resemblance to the
homely village newspaper celebrated in the utterances of early
champions of the right to freedom of expression. They are an in-
dustry and, like other industries, are engaged in competitive ex-
ploitation of consumers and workers for the purpose of rewarding
shareholders and justifying mind-boggling compensation for
themselves. In many fields, as economists are prone to urge, such
Kirk Loggins & Duren Cheek, Activists Target Tennessee Judge, NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN,
July 9, 1998, at Al.
153. For an attack on the institution, see generally Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian
Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995). Profes-
sor Croley suggests that the election of judges is a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; such a holding could be regarded as the ultimate arrogation by the Court.
154. The history of the institution is recounted in Carrington, supra note 134, at 87-
107.
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competition may in the end benefit those whom the competitors
seek to exploit. But there is scant evidence that the quality of our
public institutions is well served by the electronic media who
profit from political spot advertising and serve their viewers with
political news comprised of sound bites.'55 The chronic failure of
the market to serve the public interest in maintaining effective
public institutions is dramatically exhibited in claims made by
the media for the right to conduct their business without regard
for the justice or injustice of the outcomes of judicial proceedings.
John Henry Wigmore stated a principle no less applicable to
the media than to other citizens. The duty to assist a court by
supplying it with evidence relevant to a matter it must decide is,
he said:
a duty not to be grudged or evaded. Whoever is impelled to evade or
to resent it should retire from the society of organized and civilized
communities, and become a hermit. He is not a desirable member of
society. He who will live by society must let society live by him, when
it requires to.
... [The] inconvenience which he may suffer, in consequence of his
testimony, by way of enmity or disgrace or ridicule or other disfa-
voring action of fellow-members of the community, is also a contribu-
tion which he makes in payment of his dues to society in its function
of executing justice. If he cannot always obtain adequate solace from
this reflection, he may at least recognize that it defines an unmis-
takable axiom. When the course of justice requires the investigation
of truth, no man has any knowledge that is rightly private.
156
The Supreme Court has often affirmed the wisdom of the prin-
ciple stated by Wigmore and applied it to the media, denying con-
trary First Amendment claims. In Branzburg v. Hayes,'57 the
Court denied the right of journalists to refuse to identify their
sources when needed to pursue an investigation of facts by a Ken-
tucky grand jury.' In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,'59 it held that
newsrooms are not sheltered from reasonable searches for evi-
155. For a lively account of the contemporary role of the media in our public life, see
generally DAVID L. PALETZ, THE MEDIA IN AMERICAN POLITICS: CONTENTS AND
CONSEQUENCES (1999).
156. JOHN H. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAw § 2192, at 2697 (1905).
157. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
158. Id. at 708.
159. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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dence conducted pursuant to warrants. 60 And, in Herbert v.
Lando, 6' it upheld the right of civil litigants to compel the disclo-
sure of unpublished material in the possession of journalists.'62
These decisions evoked a strong and hostile reaction from the
media, whose members claimed immunity from the obligations of
ordinary citizens to cooperate with courts seeking to do justice.
The media succeeded in elevating their self-interest over the
rights of litigants in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart.'63 In that
case, the Court upheld the right of the press to publish in advance
of trial evidence of an accused person's guilt." It was assumed
that there are other available means to protect the accused's right
from the inflammatory effects of premature publicity of select
pieces of incriminating evidence.'65 That the assumption is always
valid is doubtful. It is, in any case, ironic that the constitutional
right to due process of law expressed in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment favors the media over the rights of litigants.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the holding in Branzburg, the
media have sometimes continued to insist on their right to refuse
to disclose information in its possession to those responsible for
law enforcement. They have succeeded in lobbying through many
state legislatures so-called "shield laws," which confer an eviden-
tiary privilege on journalists faintly resembling that which law-
yers enjoy with respect to communications received in private
from a client seeking legal advice. Such legislation exempts the
media, in limited circumstances, from the duty of citizens to give
evidence. 166
The media contend that a healthy democracy requires investi-
gative journalism, which in turn requires confidentiality for se-
cret informers. Of course, there is something to be said for the
media contention if the shield is narrowly limited to informers
who engage in whistleblowing that bears on public matters or
160. Id. at 567-68.
161. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
162. Id. at 176-77.
163. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
164. Id. at 570.
165. Id.
166. In 1998, Florida became the thirtieth state to enact a statute limiting the power of
its courts to subpoena the information of professional journalists. Agents of Discovery, The
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, at httpv-/www/rcfp.org/agents (last visited
Oct. 10, 2000).
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who otherwise supply information that would have important
practical value to readers or viewers. Maybe the identity of the
legendary "Deep Throat" should be protected even at the cost of
rendering a false judgment depriving a litigant of his or her
rights. But in many of their potential applications, such shields of
secrecy intersect and conflict with other values of at least equal
constitutional import, not least of which is the right to a fair trial
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Nation-
wide, the media as a whole comply with about half the subpoenas
served on them; about thirty percent of their challenges to sub-
poenas based on the shield laws are denied.'67
Illustrating media indifference to the social and political obli-
gation identified by Wigmore was the recent event involving the
three young men convicted in Jasper, Texas of brutally torturing
and murdering, apparently in a fit of racial hatred, an African-
American man. For CBS, Dan Rather interviewed one of the ac-
cused men in prison and broadcast selected parts of the inter-
168 thview. When the prosecutor sought access to the takeouts, CBS
invoked the First Amendment, there being no shield law in
Texas.'69
I have been unable to imagine what the accused murderer sit-
ting in his jail cell could have said to Dan Rather that has even
the slightest resemblance to the utterances of Deep Throat with
respect to any need for confidentiality. Whether he is guilty, inno-
cent, or something in between, the matter is in the public domain
and the media have no legitimate interest that differs from that
of the state of Texas, i.e., to see that all relevant evidence is pre-
sented to the trier of fact. I am also unable to conceive a reason
rooted in any public interest why accused murderers should be
given the privilege of previewing their possible testimony with
the media.
I am able, however, to imagine that other persons accused of
the same crime might desperately seek access to the same take-
outs as possible evidence of their innocence. The reader will easily
167. The data was gathered by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.
William Glaberson, News Organizations See a Threat to Their Independence in an Ava-
lanche of Subpoenas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995, at D8.
168. Sixty Minutes: Killing Time (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 28, 1999).
169. See Metro News Briefs: Prosecutor Asks Court to Demand CBS Tapes, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 1999, at B6.
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imagine civil lawsuits in which access to the takeouts might be
highly pertinent. Individual litigants are entitled to access to
relevant proof, especially if they are accused of a crime and most
especially in a capital case; it would seem to be a forthright denial
of due process to prevent a co-defendant from having access to
takeouts in the possession of a television network. Presumably,
CBS would generously concede this point in some cases, but it
appears to claim constitutional protection for its discretion in
such matters. While the constitutional protection of the Due Pro-
cess Clause does not extend to the state of Texas, the state's in-
terest in securing fair trials is surely superior to the frail interest
of the media in treating the takeouts as professional secrets that
they are free to sell or not as they see fit.
170
Despite the manifest vanity of the CBS position in resisting the
request of the prosecutor, it was voiced with utmost pretense of
virtue by Rather and by lawyers of favorable repute. Skeptics are
invited to review the transcript of the discussion on the PBS
News Hour.' 7 ' What they will find is evidence of Sunstein's obser-
vation that the media deploys the First Amendment as a bar to
any public action, however needful, that in any way discommodes
or burdens themselves.'72 I doubt whether any other legal system
on the planet would for a moment suffer the conduct of CBS. 7 ' As
Wigmore would have it, CBS should become a hermit.
XI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In these matters, the federal judiciary, of course, has followed
the leadership of the Supreme Court.
In part, what has happened is the erection by the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts of broad constitutional doctrine derived from a
170. It follows from this premise that reasonable constraints on lawyer use and misuse
of the media are warranted when necessary to protect the accused and the public interest
in a fair trial, such as the "gag order" enforced by Judge I. Leo Glasser in the recent case of
John Gotti. See United States v. Gotti, 787 F. Supp. 319, 325-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). For an
account, see Laura R. Handman & Adam Liptak, Media Coverage of Trials of the Century,
LITIGATION, Fall 1999, at 35.
171. PBS, Online News Hour: Free Press v. Fair Trial (Nov. 12, 1999), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/july-dec99/cbs_11-12.html.
172. See Sunstein, supra note 142, at 499 n.+.
173. For a comparative discussion, see Michael Chesterman, OJ and the Dingo: How
Media Publicity Relating to Criminal Cases Tried by Jury is Dealt with in Australia and
America, 45 AM. J. CotiP. L. 109 (1997).
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few highly fact-centered decisions of the Warren Court that had
been driven by civil rights concerns. Nevertheless, some of the
most objectionable applications of the First Amendment may be
the work of district and circuit judges, some of whom may not
have fully appreciated the cautions sometimes found in the
Court's utterances, or who at times have yielded to the impulse of
vanity to create some new constitutional law.
Many of the federal courts' First Amendment decisions re-
viewed here had substantive outcomes of which I approve. I do
not believe that pornography or obscenity is much of a threat to
important social values. I am mildly offended by those who choose
to burn a flag, but I would not consider punishing them. I am
more offended by burning crosses or the display of the Confeder-
ate flag, but I would not punish those deeds, either. I can avert
my eyes if I am offended by the words "Fuck the Draft" on a gar-
ment or by many other hateful utterances. As a parent and
grandparent, I would prefer that my descendants' scoutmaster
not be one making an issue of his or her homosexuality. I have re-
sisted public prayer, and I would vote against posting the Ten
Commandments in a public facility. I do not have a problem with
nude dancing, even in a barroom, with or without pasties, and I
have observed nude ballet dancers without feeling any urge to
summon the police.
My problem with the federal judiciary on these issues rests on
the recognition that none of my own opinions (anymore than
those of judges and Justices) has special value making them more
worthy of legal status than those of any randomly selected citi-
zen. Those whose views are different from mine are entitled to
vote on those issues. If some of us are deeply offended by the en-
forcement of local laws forbidding pornography, nudity, obscenity,
flag burning, commencement prayers, or preventing discrimina-
tion against homosexuals, we can sue in state courts (whose
judges have some democratic accountability for what they do), in-
voking state constitutional provisions that can be amended if the
judge's decision is an offense against the moral judgments of the
electorate.
About other outcomes discussed here, I am more doubtful of my
own preferences. Somehow or other, I would eradicate, if empow-
ered to do so, extreme graphic violence without regard to any
claims to artistic freedom. I do not know what the law should be
with respect to lawyer advertising, but I might restrain some of
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its more aggressive forms. I am inclined to think that the Food
and Drug Administration should protect consumers of products
promoted as means to health and beauty without much regard for
any right of vendors to puff their wares. I do not know what the
law of political defamation ought to be, but I am not in doubt that
the law we have as a result of Sullivan is a major source of inci-
vility in our politics. Perhaps our democratic politics could be
partly redeemed by some legislated utilization of the fairness doc-
trine applied to spot advertising on commercial television.
I have largely left to others the application of the Court's ex-
tended doctrine to communications in cyberspace, but to my ob-
servations should be added that of Daniel Farber, who observed
that "an information economy governed by the First Amendment
would not look much different from the laissez-faire world cham-
pioned by economic libertarians."74
The observations of First Amendment law recited here raise
the question of whether there is reason to confer on any corpora-
tion organized for profit a constitutional right to freedom of ex-
pression. Any resemblance of vast media empires such as Time-
Warner, Disney, or General Electric or such drug manufacturers
as Merck or Pfizer to the courageous, outspoken journalists of
Thomas Jefferson's day is absent. Such institutions are created to
pursue gain and are structurally incompetent to profess religious
faith, act on conscience, or experience the sentiments of civic vir-
tue or dissent. They are, in short, completely outside the range of
impulses and activities that the First Amendment aims to pro-
tect. There are, of course, reasons of sound policy for conferring
some such rights on such institutions, but those reasons should
be addressed to legislatures that are accountable to the people
and not to the federal judiciary.
In every respect mentioned here, the First Amendment has be-
come an instrument of class warfare by which a self-anointed
elite imposes its will on the unwashed electorate whose disre-
garded and disdained moral opinions are in a republic entitled to
equal respect. America pompously promotes democracy as the
solvent of all the world's political problems, but in regard to a
wide range of matters is itself indifferent to the moral judgment
174. Symposium, Expressive Commerce in Cyberspace: Public Goods, Network Effects,
and Free Speech, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 789, 790 (2000).
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of its own people as it is expressed by their elected representa-
tives. The people have very little say on the matters about which
many care the most.
This moral imperialism is not merely bad politics; it is bad law.
People cannot be expected to obey law that has lost its underpin-
nings in popular morality. People obey law not merely because
they fear legal consequences, but because they fear the odium
imposed on offenders by citizens regarding the law as their own.
A legal system lacking moral footings lacks that force and must
rely on the brutality of its sanctions to secure compliance, if in-
deed compliance can be achieved.
The Court has especially lost its way with respect to campaign
finance. On this, too, I am not in doubt. It is urgent that the
Court reverse or substantially qualify Buckley. It is intolerable
that the First Amendment, long treasured as an essential feature
of self-government, has been made by the Court into an instru-
ment for the subordination of the democratic process to govern-
ment controlled by the highest bidders. The combination of the
rights said to derive from the First Amendment, including the
right to anonymously spend vast sums to flood the media with
sound bites defiling those seeking to perform public service, is
dangerous to the health of the law and of the republic, if indeed
they are not a deadly potion.
It is my clear impression that we now have the most degraded
political system of any reasonably stable democracy. Of course I
am not familiar with all of them. But I am assured that candi-
dates for high office in Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Israel, Italy, Japan and Sweden do not spend vast sums on
expensively crafted television advertising to disparage the moral
character of their adversaries. Those countries, too, face difficul-
ties in preventing their most powerful citizens and organizations
from overrunning and corrupting the democratic process, but
none of them have so totally forsaken the effort to do so.
Hendrik Hertzburg was precise in decrying our current presi-
dential campaign for:
the baneful influence of money, which corrupts our most sacred insti-
tutions; the notion that it is somehow acceptable to force people to
make serious choices on the basis of distorted information gleaned
from concocted television spectacles; the promises made to be broken;
and, finally, the dark revelations about personal behavior and finan-
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cial chicanery that sooner or later emerge, giving rise to recrimina-
tions and bringing the entire enterprise into disrepute.
7 5
Doubtless the Supreme Court of the United States is not alone
responsible for this misfortune, but it is the direct product of the
Court's indifference to democratic traditions and institutions and
lack of regard for the common sense and moral judgment of fellow
citizens.
No doubt any legislated solution to the perplexing problems of
campaign finance and civility in elections will attract criticism,
and some of it will have merit. Any solution that could be passed
by a constitutionally unfettered legislature might be more objec-
tionable than the system we have. However, it would have the
virtue of being an election law enacted by persons accountable to
the people and changeable by the simple and popular remedy of
throwing the rascals out.
Effective correction of the hypertrophy of the First Amendment
seems remote. 176 Meanwhile, the Court should require itself to re-
read the Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg Ad-
dress. Or perhaps the crucial words of those scriptures should be
read aloud in court at each of its sittings in lieu of the constitu-
tionally doubtful utterance, "God save this honorable Court."
Somehow, the Court must regain a sense of its appropriately
quite limited role in protecting us from ourselves, for it has done
incalculable damage to our democratic institutions and has made
a transparent fraud of our evangelical rhetoric about the virtues
of democracy in other lands.
175. Hendrik Hertzberg, The Talk of the Town: Millions and Millions, NEW YORKER,
Mar. 6, 2000, at 29.
176. I have proposed elsewhere a limited structural remedy to the problem addressed
here. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics: Cor-
recting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397 (1999).
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